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Against the countable transitive model
approach to forcing
MATTEO DE CEGLIE
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that one of the arguments usually put forward
in defence of universism is in tension with current set theoretic practice.
According to universism, there is only one set theoretic universe, V , and
when applying the method of forcing we are not producing new universes,
but only simulating them inside V . Since the usual interpretation of set
generic forcing is used to produce a “simulation” of an extension of V from
a countable set inside V itself, the above argument is credited to be a strong
defence of universism. However, I claim, such an argument does not take into
account current mathematical practice. Indeed, it is possible to find theorems
that are available to the multiversists but that the advocate of universism
cannot prove. For example, it is possible to prove results on infinite games
in non-well-founded set-theories plus the axiom of determinacy (such as
ZF + AFA + PD) that are not available in ZFC + PD. These results,
I contend, are philosophically problematic on a strict universist approach
to forcing. I suggest that the best way to avoid the difficulty is to adopt a
pluralist conception of set theory and embrace a set theoretic multiverse.
Consequently, the current practice of set generic forcing better supports a
multiverse conception of set theory.
Keywords: Set theoretic multiverse, Foundations of Mathematics, Forcing,
Set Theory
1 Introduction
Universism is the thesis that there is only one set theoretic universe, V , that
instantiates the axioms of ZFC. Such a position has been argued by several
authors, for example by Martin (2001), Woodin (2011), Isaacson (2011),
Shelah (2014), Barton (2019), and Livadas (2020). This universe is the so
called canonical model of set theory, as opposed to all the others different
models (such as, for instance, the constructible universe L). Although it
is true that set theorists make use of all kinds of non-canonical models,
universists typically insist that each of these models can be “simulated” within
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V and that, in the end, they are only “simulated universes”. Thus, universists
typically argue against pluralist conception of set theory on the ground that
the non-canonical universes that populate the so-called multiverses can be
simulated within V . Before proceeding with the paper, I need to put forward
a disclaimer. Throughout the paper, I will refer to “models” and “universes”
interchangeably, as usually done in the multiverse literature.
Such a simulation is carried out through forcing. Forcing allows us to
produce non-canonical models of V by extending its width. For example, we
can use forcing to build models of ZFC+¬CH , or models of ZFC+CH .
In a very intuitive way, such an application of forcing produces an extended
V that is a model of ZFC + ¬CH (or ZFC + CH as the case may be).
Although this is the most intuitive explanation of forcing, one can understand
forcing in at least three different ways:
1. the countable transitive model approach to forcing;
2. the Boolean evaluated approach to forcing;
3. the natural approach to forcing.
Among these, the first is the one that is usually accepted by set theorists.
From a philosophical point of view, it is usually put forward as a defence
of universism against pluralist conceptions, according to which set theory
comprises a plurality of set-theoretic universes. (for a defence of this ap-
proach to forcing see Barton, 2019). According to this, forcing allows us to
simulate different kind of models and universes, without actually producing
them. This is because forcing is applied only to a countable transitive model
inside V . With the countable transitive model approach to forcing we are
producing a forcing extension of that model, not of the entire set theoretic
universe V . Consequently, the entirety of set theoretic practice and forcing
application are actually carried out inside the single universe V . On the other
hand, the natural approach to forcing can be applied to the entire set theoretic
universe, and thus is the most similar and respectful of the intuition that every
application of forcing produces a new set theoretic universe (for example,
one in which CH is true and one in which it is instead false). It is the one
defended by Hamkins and is the basis of his set theoretic multiverse (see e.g.
Hamkins, 2012), that accept every possible set theoretic universe as legiti-
mate and existing. Finally, the Boolean evaluated approach can be carried
out looking only at the forcing relation, without appealing to models, and
moreover it is needed to prove some interesting results like the Intermediate
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Model Theorem (this theorem says that if V |= ZFC and W |= ZFC is an
intermediate model between V and one of its forcing extension then W is
also a forcing extension of V , see Grigorieff, 1975 for details).
It is also possible to consider a purely syntactical approach to forcing,
where we focus only on the partial order (P,≤). In this case we avoid
the appeal to models, universes, generic filters and the like, and instead
investigate only the forcing relation. In other words, we don’t say that there
is a model that satisfies ϕ, but instead only that there is a p ∈ P which forces
ϕ.
In this paper, I argue that the common interpretation of forcing is actually
inadequate, since it does not align with current set theoretic practice and it
restricts the range of possible results. In particular, I argue against its use
in the universist’s argument that the multiverse can be simulated inside the
single universe V . I will do this by first arguing that, although in the single
universe V we can actually simulate any non-canonical model of set theory,
we cannot efficiently compare them all. In particular, we cannot resort to
model-theoretic techniques, or to the tools of MAXIMIZE and restrictiveness
(for example as presented by Maddy, 1996 and Incurvati & Löwe, 2014).
The paper is structured as follows. First of all I introduce the countable
transitive model approach to forcing (section 2), both from the mathematical
perspective (section 2.1) and the philosophical one (section 2.2). After this, I
present my arguments against it (section 3), with particular attention to some
examples regarding determinacy and ill-founded set theory (section 3.1). In
the end, some concluding remarks summarise the paper (section 4).
2 The countable transitive model approach to forcing
Forcing was first developed in the 60’s by Cohen as a method to produce
non-canonical models of set theory (see Cohen, 2003). These models take
the form of width extensions of V , i.e. enlargement of V “to the outside”.
Since its inception, forcing has been used mainly to prove the independence
of certain set theoretic statements from ZFC, with the two most notable
examples being the Axiom of Choice AC and the Continuum Hypothesis
CH . To prove the independence of such statements, forcing is used to build
two different extensions of V , one in which ZFC+CH holds, and the other
in which ZFC + ¬CH holds (or, in the case of AC, one in which ZFC




As mentioned in the introduction, I am mainly interested in arguing against
the countable transitive model approach to forcing and its use in the univer-
sist’s argument that the multiverse can be simulated inside the single universe
V . Before giving the details of such an argument, I need to clarify in what
sense the set theoretic multiverse can be “simulated” in the single universe V .
In set theory, we have the classical axiomatization ZFC and its canonical
model, the cumulative hierarchy V . Through the application of set generic
forcing, it is possible to produce a non-canonical model of ZFC from V .
That is to say, we can “create” a new model of ZFC + some other statement:
the usual example is the mutually incompatible models of ZFC + CH and
ZFC + ¬CH . In this case, we are creating two new models, V ′ and V ∗,
in which the Continuum Hypothesis is, respectively, true and false. These
two models are “fatter”, i.e. larger than the original V : they are usually
considered width extensions of V , produced by the addition of new subsets
to the cumulative hierarchy. There are also height extensions of V , produced
by the additions of new ordinals, but they are not relevant for this particular
argument. Crucially, set forcing cannot be applied to the whole V , but only
to countable sets. Consequently, according to such approach, in order to
produce a model of, for example, ZFC +CH , we take a countable set in V
that “simulates” the whole universe, and apply set forcing to it to produce
its width extension. But since we started with a countable set inside V , we
are not producing a whole new universe, but only a slighter larger countable
set inside the canonical universe (for a detailed account of forcing, see Nik,
2014).
The countable transitive model approach to forcing interprets the pro-
cedure just described at face value (see for example Barton, 2019). On
such a view, there is nothing outside V , and when forcing a given model
M we are not simulating something that could be outside V . Rather, the
alternative universes that we are “seeing” are nothing but a technical artifact.
This is the usual answer that universists give considering the fact that the
cumulative hierarchy of sets V is usually conceived as already containing
all possible subsets. Consequently, how could we add new subsets to it if
it already contains all of them? The countable transitive model approach
solves this impasse by appealing to the fact that all consistent first order
theories have a countable model. Thus, there is a countable set M ⊂ V that
it is a model of ZFC. From Cantor’s diagonal argument, we know that no






Figure 1: A representation of the countable transitive model approach to
forcing
countable set M must miss some of these subsets. Forcing (following this
approach) helps to “complete” the set M , by adding some of those missing
sets. Moreover, we choose which subsets we want to add in such a way that
the new expanded M ′ will be a model of the theory we are trying to study
(for example ZFC + ¬CH).
Without delving too deeply in the details, the following is a sketch of
how the forcing technique works. We start by specifying an infinite partial
order P ∈M . Since M is a countable set, it follows from Cantor’s diagonal
argument that there is some G ⊂ P that it is not in M . We pick a G such that
it is generic filter over M (so that the resulting operation is called set-generic
forcing). The key properties of a generic filter are that:
1. G is a subset of P;
2. 1 ∈ G;
3. if p is a forcing condition (forcing conditions are members of P, the
smaller they are the stronger they are) weaker than q and q ∈ G, then
p ∈ G;
4. if p, q ∈ G, then there exists in G a forcing condition smaller than
both of them;
5. G meets all dense subsets of P that are in M .
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The first four properties ensure that G is a filter, the last one that it is generic.
We add such a G to M , and write M [G] to denote the resulting extended
M with the missing subset G. Let ϕ be the statement we want to prove.
With forcing we can prove that for any such generic missing subsets of P,
M [G] |= ZFC + ϕ. At this point, we consider the forcing relation , that
connects facts about M to facts about M [G]. From this perspective, we are
proving ZFC+ϕ by proving a fact about M , i.e. that M , provided the poset
P, forces ZFC + ϕ, in symbols M P ZFC + ϕ. Furthermore, note that
this is only a claim about sets in M , and it does not carry any assumption
about the whole V . However, it is possible to generalise such result, and
prove that if there exists any M -generic G that is one of the “missing subsets”
of P, then a statement ϕ is forced if and only if for every such G, M [G] |= ϕ.
So, in other words, with forcing we can prove facts about M by adding
to it some of the subsets that it is missing. Obviously such a method is more
general: we are proving that any countable model M ∈ V can be extended to
the countable model M [G] |= ZFC+ some statement. Consequently, while
the facts of the form M  ϕ that we prove with forcing apply only inside V ,
we can interpret them as a “simulation” of an extended universe V [G].
2.2 The philosophical argument in favour of universism
The appeal of this method for universists lies in the fact that it allows us
to bypass the limitation of a single V that contains all possible subsets,
while still being able to use forcing to produce non-canonical models of set
theory. Their opposition to the multiverse conception of set theory is rooted
in the fact that there are no V -generic filters, simply because, according to
universists, V already has all the possible subsets, so we cannot apply our
method of forcing to add some more subsets (the situation with class forcing
is more complex, see for example Antos, 2018).
Consequently, the advocate of universism argues that it is not possible
to apply set-generic forcing to the whole V , so that the very notion of
“extension of V ” is meaningless. All we can do is to use countable transitive
sets inside V as simulations of the whole V , and consider the extensions of
such countable models as “simulacra” of those elusive extensions of V .
Even though it may seem that the countable transitive model approach
curtails the power of forcing, it is still versatile and powerful enough. For
instance, in V we can construct both models of ZFC+V = L and models of
ZFC+LCs (e.g. ZFC+ “there exists a measurable cardinal”), even though




Figure 2: A representation of the natural interpretation to forcing
that says that all the sets of the universe can be built from simpler sets,
and it is incompatible with the existence of most large cardinals). A point
in favour of such an interpretation of forcing is the fact that every result
achieved regarding forcing extensions and non-canonical models of ZFC
can be achieved using such restrictive interpretation of forcing.
Moreover, even other interpretations of forcing, e.g.. the Boolean eval-
uated method and the natural forcing interpretations, can still be used as
arguments for universism. With the Boolean evaluated method, instead of
assigning a truth value to the statement ϕ we want to force, we pick a truth
value from an atomless Boolean Algebra. We then pick an ultrafilter P in
this algebra that assignes truth values to statements in our theory T . We can
finally interpret the resulting model of the theory T + P as extending the
old one with this new ultrafilter. The natural forcing method on the other
hand admits the existence of a V -generic filter missing a subset G and thus
of a generic extension V [G]. However, both alternative interpretations of
forcing can still be considered compatible with the Single Universe view.
The Boolean evaluated method can also be seen as being carried out entirely
within V , since there is no appeal to its extensions, while the natural forcing
interpretation (for details see Hamkins, 2012) can be interpret as a techical
tool that creates the illusion of real extensions of V . Moreover, all the re-
sults that can be obtained using one of these forcing interpretations can be
re-formulated using another one. So, for example, if I prove ϕ using the
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countable transitive model approach, I can also prove it using the Booleans
evaluated method instead.
Thus, we have an intuitively natural way to interpret forcing from the
universism perspective: forcing is actually carried out completely inside V ,
and even when it seems that this is not the case (with the natural forcing
interpretation), we are in fact only using a technical artefact to make things
easier and more intuitive.
3 Against the countable transitive model approach
The countable transitive model approach, while enticing, has some problems.
First of all suppose that we accept the natural interpretation of forcing only
for its instrumental value. This means not committing to the existence of
the non-canonical models, however without commiting to their complete
non-existence either. They are useful and allows us to gain insights on the
true and unique universe of sets, and as such they are admitted in our set
theoretic discourse. Although this objection is compelling, I claim that a
purely instrumental view of these canonical models is already a pluralist
and multiversistic view of the set theoretic universe. It may well be that, if
asked, a universist will profess that there exists only one set theoretic universe
(albeit indeterminate and incomplete). However, if her day to day practice is
actually multiversist, her argument lose strenght.
Nevertheless, suppose instead that we don’t want anything to do with
these non-canonical extensions of V , and instead claim that we can investi-
gate the countable models just as easily as the multiversist. In doing so, we
appeal to the fact that we can use methods from model theory and methods
from interpretability theory (see Visser, Enayat, Kalantari, & Moniri, 2006).
However, neither of these methods is ideal, and there are some problems
in using them. Very briefly, interpretability theory uses the notion of iso-
morphism to study the sameness of theories (e.g. mutual interpretability,
synonymy, etc.). In particular, it is possible to use it to prove that a theory
is restrictive over another theory, i.e. it proves fewer isomorphisms. This
approach is quite promising, but it has one important drawback: it can only
be used at its full force to compare models of theories that are mutually
bi-interpretable (two theories are mutually bi-interpretable if and only if in
any model M of the first theory T we can define a domain N in such a way
that it is a model of the other theory S and the other way around, and if and
only if these two new models N and N ′ are isomorphic, see Visser et al.,
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2006 for details). In our example, both the theories ZFC + V = L and
ZFC+ “there exists a measurable cardinal” are only mutually interpretable,
but not bi-interpretable (no two theories extending ZFC are bi-interpretable,
see Visser et al., 2006 and Enayat, 2016), so we cannot compare them using
restrictiveness methods. The model-theoretic tools are also problematic. In
general, it is preferable to use object-linguistic methods, i.e. methods that
are carried out directly in the object language . However, model-theoretic
methods are essentially meta-theoretic, since they take models of a given
theory to be the objects of the investigation, and we cannot do this in the
theory itself. In general, a method that works directly in the theory is to be
preferred, since in this way we avoid having to justify the legitimacy of our
meta-theory and our methods. The main consequence of this fact is that we
cannot efficiently compare two non-canonical models. It would be better
if we could compare them in a common context. In principle, ZFC could
be such a context, but other than the technical problems just hinted there
are also philosophical and interpetative problems. In particular, if we take
a universist stance regarding V , we have to commit to it: is it equal to L,
but without measurable cardinals, or not (but with measurable cardinals)?
This forced choice will restrict the range of possible results we can prove. So
the problem for the universist still stands: committing to a single universe,
in which the full power of forcing techniques cannot be used, or accept
a pluralist conception (even if only for instrumental reasons). Indeed, all
these non-canonical models are available in the set theoretic multiverse, and
we can prove all possible results comparing them, especially isomorphisms
between their structures. This can be done in a better way because in the
set theoretic multiverse we can define a different language for each of the
universes (see Hamkins (2012) for details). This enable us to use the methods
of restrictiveness without any limitation. Moreover, we could even easily
use model theoretic methods without having to retreat to the meta-theory:
we can do all sorts of model theoretic constructions directly in the theory of
the multiverse, in which the various universes are only objects. Clearly this
cannot be done in all multiverses: there are multiverse conceptions perfect
for this purpouses and conceptions less so. However, in general, compared
with a pluralistic conception of set theory, such as the ones advocated by
Hamkins (2012), Steel (2014), Antos, Friedman, Honzik, and Ternullo (2018)
and Gorbow and Leigh (2020), the universist conception has a lot less power
in comparing these non-canonical models.
The other problem with this account is that it does not allow to compare
two non-canonical models that are mutually incompatible in an efficient way
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(as already mentioned). Moreover, it is not possible to efficiently use one
model in the investigation of the other one. For example, it is possible to
first produce by forcing a model M of ZFC + CH and then a model N
of ZFC + CH + PD such that M ⊆ N . And in this case we can use
all the tools available in the model of ZFC + CH in our second model of
ZFC + CH + PD. However, consider the situation in which we first force
a model M of ZFC + ¬CH , and then a model N of ZFC + CH such
that M ⊆ N . In this case, we cannot use any added object or method from
M in the new model N (in particular, we cannot use the existence of a set
x such that |N| < |x| < |R| from the model M |= ZFC + ¬CH in the
model N |= ZFC+CH). For a less trivial example, consider M |= ZFC+
“there exists a measurable cardinal” and N |= ZFC + V = L: we cannot
use the existence of a measurable cardinal in M to prove something about
N , since the measurable cardinal cannot be found in N .
Another drawback of the countable transitive model approach is that it
can be applied only to a very small subset of all the possible models of set
theory, i.e. to only the countable transitive ones, and even this application is
problematic, mainly because there are meta-mathematical problems regarding
them (as Hamkins, 2012 points out). First, it follows from the Incompleteness
Theorem, that if ZFC is consistent, then it cannot prove the existence of
these models. A possible solution would be to assume that ZFC is consistent
(so we assume Con(ZFC)). In this new theory, we can indeed prove that
there are countable models of ZFC. However, we still cannot prove that they
are transitive, since if they exist then ZFC + Con(ZFC) is consistent (so
Con(ZFC + Con(ZFC))). Consequently, we can either simply assume
their existence (but this is not really satisfactory), or work in a stronger
theory than ZFC that can serve as a suitable meta-theory. However, this
move is hardly justifiable, since the same arguments will still apply to the
meta-theory. Indeed, the strength of the universist’s argument comes from the
fact that everything is carried out inside V , and in the theory itself. However,
the insurmountable problem of incompleteness compels the universist to
carry out forcing in the meta-theory. Being a meta-theory, it has its own
model, in which V is an object. Obviously this “meta-model” cannot be
located inside V itself, but it has to be“outside” it. For the multiversist this
is obviously not a problem (see for example Gorbow & Leigh, 2020 for
an interesting construction around this problem). Even a very moderate
potentialist (potentialism is one of the positions, the other being actualism,
regarding the “expandability” of V : actualism states that V is not, while
potentialism states that it is possible, with radical potentialism admitting
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expansion both in height, adding new ordinals, and in width, adding new
subsets, while for moderate potentialism only one of those expansions is
possible) that does not claim the existence of a full multiverse can still be able
to operate “outside” V with the help of admissible sets (for details on how
admissible sets work, see Barwise, 1975). On the other hand, the universist
can no longer claim that everything he is doing is done inside V , and has to
concede that there is actually something other than V .
Nevertheless, let’s ignore this point, and concede to the universist that
their countable transitive model approach to forcing can actually be carried
out inside V in its entirety without any of the problems mentioned above.
Even in this case, the universist argument incurs in one major problem,
caused by the fact that it cannot compare two incompatible models and use
them to prove something in one another. Without this possibility, the range
of possible results and theorems is restricted.
3.1 Determinacy and ill-founded set theory
The inability to consider (in the sense explained above) two mutually incom-
patible models produced by forcing means that there are results that cannot
be proved in the Single Universe context described above. In contrast, in a
multiverse conception of set theory (or a “Single Universe” with an instru-
mental acceptance of the natural approach to forcing) we can prove a theorem
in a particular model using tools and methods from an incompatible model.
Obviously we should proceed with caution. Suppose we have produced two
models N ⊆M , such that M |= ZFC+ “there exists a huge cardinal” and
N |= ZFC + V = L. In this case, we cannot use the existence of a huge
cardinal in M to prove the existence of a measurable cardinal in N , even
though N is contained in M and the existence of a huge cardinal implies the
existence of a measurable one.
For another, more complex, example, consider the relation between the
Axiom of Determinacy (AD), ill-founded set theory, and infinite games. An
infinite game is a series of plays in which two players, player I and player II,
alternately pick a number (this could be a natural number or, in the case of
the Banach-Mazur game, a real number). After infinite many such moves,
a sequence of natural numbers (ni)i∈ω (or of real numbers, but here I will
stick to the simplest case) is generated: if (ni)i∈ω ∈ A, then player I wins,
otherwise if (ni)i∈ω /∈ A player II wins (figure 1 is an example of such
games). The set A is the outcome set, or winning set. Player I has a winning
strategy if there is a sequence of plays that he can make such that the overall
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sequence ends up in the outcome set, while player II has a winning strategy if
he can make plays that avoids player I winning. The Axiom of Determinacy
I r0 r2 . . . rn
II r1 r3 . . . rn+1
Table 1: An infinite game
states that every infinite game is determined, i.e. one of the players has a
winning strategy (for details on AD see Woodin, 1999). Note that these
does not entail that both players can have a winning strategy. We know that
this axiom is incompatible with the Axiom of Choice, since using AC it is
possible to build a game in which both players lose. However, it is possible to
restrict ourselves to the Axiom of Projective Determinacy (PD), that instead
states that the winning sets, i.e. the victory conditions, are projective sets,
that is compatible with AC.
Intuitively, we can arrange and represent these infinite games as trees.
All the possible sequences of the game are the various branches of the tree,
and each play determines which branch we are following. The winning
conditions does not change, and we can interpret the winning strategy in
terms of branches: a winning strategy for player I is a branch that is in the
outcome set, while a winning strategy for player II is a branch that is not in
the winning set (see figure 3).
Winning Set
Figure 3: An infinite game as a tree
Now, since these infinite games are representable as trees, it is very natural to
study them by means of a non-well-founded set theory (for an introduction to
non-well founded set theory, see Aczel, 1988). Non-well founded set theory
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admits ill-founded sets, that is, sets that contains themselves as members.
These sets are not admitted in ZFC (their existence is ruled out by the Axiom
of Foundation), but they can be admitted in a non-well founded set theory by
replacing the Axiom of Foundation with one of the several anti-foundation
axioms. Among them, the most important is the Anti-Foundation Axiom
(AFA), that states that every rooted digraph (a graph in which a vertex is
recognised as the root) corresponds to a unique set. For example, the loop
graph (a graph with only one vertex and an edge to itself) corresponds to
the set {x}. Non-well founded set theory (for example ZFA, i.e. ZFC−
Foundation +AFA) is very similar to classical set theory, since all the
proofs and definitions in which the Axiom of Foundation is not needed
still go through as normal (for example, Russell’s Paradox, the Axiom of
Choice, relations, pairs, natural numbers, transfinite recursion etc.). The
main difference is on how we can approach objects that could have some
circularity in their definition (for example, graphs, infinite chains etc.).
Another possible formulation of AFA is that every graph as a unique
decoration. A decoration d of a graph G is a function from the vertices to
natural numbers, with the following property:
d(g) = {d(h) : g → h}.
In other words, the decoration function takes a vertex as an input, and gives
the set corresponding to its children as the output. For example, take the leaf
of a digraph: since it has no children, its decoration is the empty set. Suppose
instead that we want to calculate the decoration of a vertex just before the
leaf: in this case, that vertex has one children (the leaf), so its decoration is
the singleton {∅}. A graph can be extended by adding to it the decoration of
its children.
It is possible to approach questions about infinite games from the per-
spective of non-well-founded set theory. In particular, such a perspective
enables us to use tools and methods available only in non-well-founded set
theory (mainly abbreviations of proofs and definitions regarding graphs and
infinite trees) to the investigation of infinite games. For example, we can
prove that there is a point in which player I has a winning strategy and player
II no longer has one appealing to extended graphs and decorations: if that
particular tree can be extended by adding a subset of the winning set, then
player I has a winning strategy while player II no longer has one (since every
move that she can make are already in the subset of the winning set). This is
only one of the possible examples of interaction between determinacy and
non-well-founded set theory, but it is possible to use the axiom that every tree
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corresponds to a unique set to prove more interesting results (the existence
of unique winning strategies, for example). However, to get these results,
we need to assume AFA. Consequently, if we believe only in the countable
transitive model approach to forcing sketched above, we would not be able
to prove these results, since in that case we cannot use objects and tools from
ZFA in ZFC +PD (we could try to work directly in ZFC +PD, but this
could be problematic). By contrast, even in a very simplified toy multiverse
composed of only two universes, one well founded and one non-well founded,
those results are instead available.
4 Concluding remarks
In conclusion, appealing to the fact that we can simulate any non-canonical
model of set theory (an thus set theoretic universe) in the Single Universe V
is in tension with current set theoretic practice. Thus, it cannot be used to
defend the universist position. In particular, I claim that with the countable
transitive model approach non-canonical incompatible models cannot be
efficiently compared and that we cannot use them in the investigation of one
another, which in turn makes it impossible to prove a number of results in
set theory - results, however, that by contrast are attainable in a multiverse
conception of set theory. For the sake of definitness, I have introduced some
results that cannot be proved in the Single Universe context with the appeal
to ill-founded sets, but that instead can only be proved in a set theoretic
multiverse.. These results can be proved using the tools and methods of
ill-founded set theory, and in particular the fact that every extended graph
has a unique decoration. However to prove this we need both the Anti-
Foundation Axiom and at least Projective Determinacy, and such a setting
it is not possible in the Single Universe with only the countable transitive
model approach to forcing at our disposal.
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